China appoints new defence minister, but opacity reigns

Beijing [China]: Even as President Xi Jinping promised that Taiwan would be “reunified” with the mainland, China’s newly appointed Defence minister was making himself comfortable in the office of his predecessor, who disappeared after being ensnared in a scandal.

After disappearing from public view in August, Li Shangfu was formally removed as Defence minister and as a CMC member on October 24. 2023, but no explanation has ever been given as to why.

Cue China’s 14th defence minister, Admiral Dong Jun, who formerly commanded the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). His ascension was announced by the Standing Committee on 29 December 2023.
Dong is not in the Central Military Commission (CMC) – the top body chaired by Xi that supervises all aspects of China’s military – and significantly he is the first naval officer to become defence minister.

The role of the Defence minister is largely a ceremonial and diplomatic one, with no influence over the day-to-day affairs of the PLA. However, as a diplomat liaison, Dong will represent the PLA and CMC in interactions with foreign militaries.

Dr. Andrew Erickson, professor of Strategy at the China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) of the US Naval War College, said, “The breadth of Admiral Dong Jun’s career makes him uniquely qualified to serve as defence minister, where he will represent the PLA at bilateral meetings and high-profile forums on the international stage. His navy and joint operational assignments enhance his ability to articulate and defend Chinese Communist Party ( CCP ) positions regarding the East China Sea and South China Sea disputes, and address PLA operations regarding the PLA’s most pressing objective: Taiwan.”

Dong’s naval experience, including command of the Southern Theater Command that is responsible for the South China Sea region, reinforces China’s prioritisation China on its illegal territorial claims there.
Dr. Erickson noted, “Joint and naval familiarity and credibility, together with Admiral Dong Jun’s long track record and seasoned status as an international interlocutor, will be particularly helpful with messaging on CCP / PRC strategic goals – the focus of his new position.”

Born in the port city of Yantai in Shandong Province in 1961, Dong began his naval career in 1978 to become a surface warfare officer. Dong was elevated to PLAN deputy commander in March 2021, before becoming its commander in August of that year.

Importantly, Dong is not on a US sanctions list as his predecessor was.

“Admiral Dong Jun’s path-breaking career has made him one of the PLA ‘s most experienced joint commanders,” Dr. Erickson said, adding, “with deep expertise regarding the operational level of warfare. He has international, joint and extensive naval experience in the Eastern and Southern Theater Commands, the two most important areas of unresolved PRC sovereignty claims now aggressively pursued under Xi.”

” Taiwan’s January 13, 2024, presidential election and the PLA response – while an Eastern Theater Command responsibility and role – will be one of Admiral Dong Jun’s first tests on the international stage.

While the nature of any PLA military response to the elections is unknown, Dong will be charged with representing the PLA response to foreign audiences. Through his actions, he will be charged with demonstrating to foreign and domestic audiences alike, the PRC’s unwavering resolve to unify with Taiwan. Given the stakes for all concerned, Dong’s time on centre stage will be closely scrutinized. But his navy and joint operational background, coupled with foreign engagement prowess, suggests he will be well prepared to address this challenge,” the American academic added.

“Within the limits of his position, Dong is likely to advocate for more robust PLA joint integration – especially as it relates to PLA options for Taiwan – based on his experience overseeing PLA joint operations in the Eastern and Southern Theater Commands,” the CMSI stated further.

He also has had extensive engagement with Russian and Pakistani counterparts.
There is no doubt that China needs a new defence minister, considering that it took an inexplicable four months to replace disgraced Li Shangfu.

Such a figure is needed to liaise with counterparts like US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, especially after Xi recently reestablished communications between the PLA and the USA.

Xi said earlier, “Corruption is the biggest cancer that harms the vitality and combat effectiveness of the party, and anti-corruption is the most thorough self-revolution.”
One can only hope that Xi’s pick for the new defence minister will be more discerning than previous candidates.

Mystery surrounds Wei Fenghe, the Defence minister before Li Shangfu, who also disappeared last year.
Interestingly, Wei was the first head of the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF), a branch of the Chinese military currently hit hardest by scandal.

Indeed, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC) officially dismissed nine top generals from its legislature on 29 December 2023. No reason was given for their disqualification, but since NPC representatives enjoy immunity from arrest or criminal charges, stripping them of their roles is a necessary prerequisite to punishments being meted out.

Of the nine, five had connections with the PLARF. Specifically, those ousted included PLARF commander Li Yuchao; a PLARF deputy commander Li Chuanguang; former PLARF deputy commander Zhang Zhenzhong, who was most recently deputy chief of the Joint Staff Department; Zhou Yaning, former commander of the PLARF from 2017-22; and Lu Hong, another member of the PLARF.
Incidentally, PLARF political commissar Liu Guangbin, who disappeared at the same time as Li Yuchao, was not on the CCP naughty list.

Much of this scandal seems connected to the procurement of weapons for the PLARF.

Also to fall from grace on 29 December were Ding Laihang, a former PLA Air Force (PLAAF) commander (2017-21); Zhang Yulin, former deputy director of the General Armament Department (the precursor to the present-day Equipment Development Department, or EDD); Rao Wenmin, a member of the EDD; and Ju Xinchun, navy commander of the Southern Theater Command since February 2023.

Two days earlier, the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference voted to remove three high-ranking officials of the military-industrial complex: Liu Shiquan (chair of the board of China North Industries Group Corporation [Norinco]); Wu Yansheng (board member of the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation [CASC]); and Wang Changqing (an executive member of CASC).
It is likely that all three dealt with Li Shangfu at the time he led the EDD from September
2017 till October 2022.

What is stunning is the depth and breadth of corruption. Top leaders of the PLARF, PLAAF, EDD and the military industry are all implicated. One wonders how many more will eventually be ensnared.
Everyone knows the PLA and CCP are rampant with corruption, but even after such a prolonged anti-graft campaign, things seem as corrupt as ever.

Last time, Xi appointed a PLARF figure as Defence minister. But this time he turned elsewhere and seconded a naval officer instead. This surely reflects his mistrust of the current status of the PLARF, plus his desire for personal loyalty.

However, such a system based on fealty, rather than meritocracy, could eventually redound on Xi’s head as the promotion system becomes more opaque and the risk of disgruntlement
rises.

All these shenanigans underscore the opacity of China’s military. No matter who the defence minister is, transparency is elusive.

Despite pumping billions of dollars into the PLA, the organization is ripe with corruption. The aura of the PLA as an effective and modern force has been punctured yet again by this latest round of dismissals, and there seems no end to the rot within.

Xi’s crackdown on corruption has been ongoing for a decade already, and yet, worryingly, the PLA’s highest leaders continue to be arrested. These are not just isolated bad apples, but rather symptoms of a deep-seated malaise.

Nor does it say much about the vetting process for key PLA leaders.

To be appointed directly by Xi, those promoted are supposed to be whiter than white. The fact that so many are thoroughly corrupt constitutes a humiliation for Xi.
It will take a considerable length of time for his trust in this key strategic force responsible for
China’s nuclear arsenal to rebound.

This is a rude awakening for Xi. He constantly exhorts the PLA to be ready to “fight and win battles”, but it seems its leaders are more interested in personal gain. Surely this must deter Xi from taking any serious military action in the short term. How can he launch a campaign unless he has full confidence in his leaders and their ability to follow orders implicitly?

These replaced leaders once professed loyalty to the CCP and to Xi personally, but it turned out that their oaths meant nothing. Xi must rightly question the motives of others that remain. This must be particularly galling for Xi as he addresses his greatest potential achievement ever – colonizing or conquering Taiwan.
To call it reunification is a gross error, for the CCP has never ruled over Taiwan. In his televised New Year’s address, Xi said, “China will surely be reunified, and all Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait should be bound by a common sense of purpose.”

His carefully calibrated remarks were stronger in tone than those issued the preceding year, for
Taiwan will go to presidential and parliamentary polls on January 13.

China has likened the electoral process to a decision between war and peace, for it despises the current Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) that is likely to regain power. Beijing considers DPP frontrunner William Lai as a ‘separatist’ and ‘destroyer of peace’.

It also accused Lai of being “the instigator of a potentially dangerous war in the Taiwan Strait”.
However, it is China alone that is instigating a confrontation.

As 2023 drew to a close, Taiwan’s government issued a summary of Chinese military intimidation, with more than 1,700 deliberately provocative flight incursions by the PLA into Taiwan’s air defence identification zone last year.

With Admiral Dong Jun being elevated to defence minister, Xi filled the gap by appointing a replacement.
On 25 December 2023, Xi promoted Vice Admiral Hu Zhongming to admiral and appointed him commander of the PLAN. The fact that Dong Jun attended the ceremony indicated this was an orderly succession, unlike the jumbled mess of the PLARF in recent times.

The CMSI at the US Naval War College highlighted a number of relevant skills possessed by Admiral Hu.
Possessing operational experience on both submarines and surface ships, this should help him promote coordination across domains.

He commanded the 2nd Submarine Base on Hainan Island, which has nuclear-powered attack submarines that operate in the South China Sea.

He was also a submarine commander till 2010, and has probably sailed these contested waters himself. “This confers significant real-world experience operating in contested waters and may portend a vision to use the PLAN more aggressively in gray zone activities or even future conflict, although the commander’s core responsibilities are to man, train and equip the force.”

Hu spent the past two years as the PLAN Chief of Staff.

Prior to that, from December 2019 till December 2021, he commanded the Northern Theater Command Navy from his hometown of Qingdao.

He fuses the experience of theatre command, technical, exercise testing and operational knowledge. This will surely help him direct PLAN efforts to address shortcomings it faces amidst its rapid expansion.
As a submariner, he should be able to address PLAN weaknesses in undersea warfare.

He participated in the PLAN’s first global circumnavigation and also led the Sino-Russian exercise Joint Sea 2017.

CMSI stated, “As tenth commander in the PLAN’s 74-year history, Admiral Hu brings a broad organizational and functional background, as well as valuable technical and operational prowess to a force whose surface fleet and anti-surface mission and missiles have burgeoned dramatically, but whose submarine leadership and training apparently still lag overall.”

“Xi’s selection of Admiral Hu Zhongming to lead the PLAN reflects his priority for PLA military commanders to have real-world operational experience, and follows a trend of PLAN leaders who bring credible warfighting capabilities to their leadership roles. Hu’s operational experience will guide efforts to rapidly address identified shortcomings within the PLAN and to enhance its warfighting capabilities across all PLAN warfare domains and with other services,” the CMSI stated further.